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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue to be addressed is whether it is permissible under the
Constitution's equal protection of law principle to implement raceconscious decision-making in public elementary and secondary schools,
when race-neutral income integration is equally effective in promoting
efforts to obtain the benefits of a diverse student body. In theory, it is
possible for a plan which, for the purpose of enhancing racial diversity,
relies on race as a factor in making decisions about which school a
student will attend to survive the narrowly tailored requirement.
* Associate Dean & Roberson King Professor, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I am grateful to Professor Christine Goodman of Pepperdine
University School of Law for her helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I extend a
special word of thanks to my wife and my children for their support.
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However, any plan to assign students using race is virtually certain to be
viewed as unconstitutional because it is not likely to survive strict
scrutiny. This is the case because income integration is likely to expand
diversity while closing the academic achievement gap among students
without any consideration of race.
In the field of public education, the Supreme Court has leveled the
race-conscious constitutional law playing field by presuming that
virtually any use of race in assigning children to a school in order to
support racial diversity is constitutionally suspect and presumed to be
invalid. In the era following the ParentsInvolved In Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents Involved)' decision a
challenger to the use of race-based student assignment only has to
articulate an effective race-neutral alternative to defeat the use of race in
making school assignments to promote either racial diversity or racial
integration.2 Supporters of integration in public schools may contend
that racial integration and racial diversity in public elementary and
secondary education are constitutionally permissible, and are considered
compelling governmental interests under principles articulated b the
Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger3 and Gratz v. Bollinger, two
cases from 2003 involving higher education.
There are many compelling reasons for prohibiting the government
from using race as a factor in making decisions about assigning students
to schools. Therefore, laws or policies using race as a factor in
determining students' school assignments to advance diversity should
be presumed unconstitutional, especially when public school officials
fail to engage in a good faith consideration of household income. Such
consideration of income is an effective race-neutral method to promote
equal education and social diversity. In the future, America must mature
into a nation that construes the equal protection principles of the U.S.
Constitution as prohibiting the use of race as a factor in determining
which school any child attends. Once the government is categorically
and unequivocally mandated not to use race as a factor in making
decisions about student assignment, Americans supporting equal
education must demand a middle-class education for all students,
regardless of the racial or social makeup of the student body. In San
1. 551 U.S. 701, 728 (2007) (stating that in each case, relying on race was unnecessary
to achieve the school's stated goals).
2. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is not violated when the use of race is used to further a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that a college's admissions policy must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest in diversity).
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
4. Id. at 275.
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Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,5 the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to mandate greater educational equality for each and every
student when it rejected the argument that equal protection principles
rationally required a state to invest equal educational resources from
available public funding in all schools, including those in property-poor
school districts. A failure to adopt income integration, which would
significantly expand the number of students receiving a middle-class
education, places America at risk of becoming noncompetitive in the
global marketplace because of a substantial number of uneducated
people in its workforce.
Part II of this Article includes a discussion of the historical
development of the requirement that public school officials not consider
race in making decisions about which school a student should attend.
Part III provides a review of the Equal Protection Clause and strict
scrutiny. In Part IV, an analysis of ParentsInvolved reveals a manifest
failure to consider race-neutral alternatives for advancing educational
diversity under a student assignment plan. Part V makes the argument
that the equal education promise of Brown v. Board of Education may
be resurrected by dismantling income segregation among students in
public schools.
II. A DISCUSSION OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS NOT CONSIDER
RACE IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHICH SCHOOL A STUDENT
SHOULD ATTEND

On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered an opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education6 prohibiting racial discrimination in
public schools. Professor Michael Ashley Stein contends that Brown
may generally be regarded as more famous than all the other American
civil rights cases of the twentieth century.7 Other legal scholars also
have asserted that the Brown decision is the most famous decision ever
written by the U.S. Supreme Court.8 In my opinion, Brown is an
important Supreme Court decision, because it sent a necessary message
that the white supremacy doctrine of separate but equal was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Brown was a
pragmatic game changer, because it put the Supreme Court on record as
rejecting white supremacy as the law of the land in the field of public
5. 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword: Disabling Brown, 14 WM. & MARY BLL RTs. J.
1421, 1421 (2006).
8. Id. at 1428 n.2.
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education. Although the Brown decision was a necessary first step in
combating the evils imposed by state-enforced race-based segregation
in education, the Brown opinion may 9 be construed as containing a
relatively narrow constitutional purpose.
While Professor Michael J. Klarman acknowledges that Brown v.
Board of Education is normally considered to be one of the most
noteworthy decisions in the history of the Supreme Court, he contends
that very little scholarly attention has been devoted to supporting
Brown's historical significance.10 Klarman stated that "[w]hile nearly
everyone assumes that Brown has had momentous implications for
American race relations, nobody has bothered to identify the precise
channels through which Brown effected change."" The historical
significance of Brown in advancing the civil rights movement is
incremental.12 Klarman acknowledges that although Brown failed to
immediately desegregate southern schools, the Brown decision was
significant because it provided judicial support for federal legislation
outlawing racial segregation.'
The belief that federal legislation
demanding integration only occurred because of the rationale of the
Brown decision is persuasive. 14 Professor David J. Garrow correctly
contends that Brown was vital in raising the hopes of AfricanAmericans that help in achieving racial equality was on the way.15
Before the Brown decision, African-Americans understood, by both
logic and experience, that "separate but equal" laws were intended to
send the message of white superiority and black inferiority. Professor
9. Id. at 1423.
10. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1994).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 9-10.
Across the South as a whole, just over 0.15% of black schoolchildren in
1960 and 1.2% in 1964 were attending school with whites. Only after the
1964 Civil Rights Act threatened to cut off federal educational funding for
segregated school districts and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in 1966 adopted stringent enforcement guidelines did the
integration rate in the South rise to 32% in 1968-1969 and 91.3% in 19721973. As one commentator has rightly observed: "The statistics from the
Southern states are truly amazing. For ten years, 1954-1964, virtually
nothing happened."
Id. (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id.
15. See David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 153-54 (1994) (rejecting Klarman's dismissal of the
notion that Brown raised the hopes of African-Americans).
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Gerald N. Rosenberg maintains that Brown transformed society's
thinking about race relations and created significant legal and social
reformations.' 6 Although Rosenberg considers Brown to be one of the
Court's greatest decisions, he suggests that Brown may not have done
very much to advance school integration in the battle for civil rights.'
Although public school desegregation was the narrow context in which
Brown was branded a landmark decision, it is clear that Brown's major
significance was its denouncement of the Jim Crow "separate but equal"
system of white supremacy. If one accepts Klarman's proposition that
Brown's success should be determined by the total number of AfricanAmerican children who attend predominately white schools, then one
can claim Brown is a disappointing failure.' 8 If Brown's historical goal
is viewed simply as the achievement of a significant amount of public
school integration among white and black children, it may be treated as
a failure.19 Brown is a giant in constitutional law in America because it
gave supporters of racial equality a fighting chance to achieve racial
justice by prohibiting the use of governmental power as a tool to
enforce white supremacy.
Judge John Parker demonstrated an accurate understanding of the
relatively narrow holding in Brown.20 "The Constitution . . . does not
require integration..

.

. It merely forbids the use of governmental power

to enforce segregation." 2 1 Denying a state the ability to use
governmental power to enforce race-based separate but equal white
supremacy laws is technically a narrow constitutional holding with
major implications for destroying white supremacy under the rule of
law. Brown's very narrow constitutional ruling has been overshadowed
by its historic value as an official judicial declaration of independence
from the racial oppression created by the separate but equal doctrine.
Judge Parker's understanding that Brown did not require racial
integration, but prohibited racial segregation by state action, was
virtually universally accepted in the years directly following Brown.22
School districts in Baltimore and St. Louis implemented, without
challenge, freedom-of-choice and neighborhood plans that basically
maintained the earlier patterns of racial segregation.2 3 Judge Parker's
16. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown is Dead!Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to
Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REv. 161, 171 (1994); see id. at 171 n.32.
17. Id.
18. Mark Tushnet, The Signficance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 173,
175 (1994).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955)).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 234 (1994)).
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treatment of Brown as removing the option to require racial segregation
in public places by a state is correct.
Brown was intended not to bring about mandatory integration, but to
begin the fundamental race-neutral principle of denouncing the
philosophy of white supremacy in constitutional law. 24 However, a
natural result of a vigorous enforcement of Brown's prohibition against
racial discrimination would lead to expanded integration based on
common interests. Needless to say, Brown's prohibition against racial
discrimination has never been vigorously enforced. The argument that
Brown articulated a race-neutral principle to attack the presumed racial
inferiority of African-Americans is a controversial proposition.
However, research reveals that the legal illusion of black inferiority has
an oversupply of examples throughout American history and "[w]e must
remember the lesson of history that those who most effectively
perpetuated the myth of black inferiority were educated and powerful
members of society, such as Chief Justice Roger Taney." 25
A good faith reading of the race-neutral rule of law flowing from
Brown demonstrates that race is not a permissible factor for the
government to consider when making decisions about public benefits or
burdens. Brown's revolutionary race-neutral rationale placed the
Supreme Court on record as rejecting the legend of black inferiority and
white supremacy enforced under the separate but equal doctrine. 26 A
proper view of Brown maintains that race is an unacceptable basis for
government choices that subordinated African-Americans27 or
discriminated against whites because of race. Governmental
pronouncements based on race after the Brown decisions were quickly
deemed unconstitutional.2 8 Brown is truly a decision announcing a
principle to prohibit racial discrimination with the implicit
understanding that racial integration would benefit directly from the
destruction of the separate but equal doctrine. As a race-neutral
doctrine, Brown's judicial rejection of the separate but equal doctrine
revolutionized the conceptual framework of race relations throughout
American society because the doctrine "reached beyond the belief that
Whites were superior to the premise that the superior group should also
rule and dominate every aspect of culture." 29
24. Id. at 176.
25. A. Leon Higginbotham, The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence:Chief
Justice Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of the Precept
ofBlack Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1695, 1708 (1996).
26. Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v. Board of
Education: A Cultural,Historical-Legal,And PoliticalPerspective, 47 How. L.J. 627, 644-45
(2004).
27. Id. at 637-38.
28. Tushnet, supra note 18, at 176.
29. Combs & Combs, supra note 26, at 638.
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Prior to the Brown decision, one commentator argued that "no
institution of the national government" had approved the general
principle laid out in Brown prohibiting the government from
discriminating against individuals based on their race.3o Congress, in the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, made it illegal for private actors to
discriminate against an African-American, or any other person, on the
basis of race in places of public accommodation.31 By holding in the
Civil Rights Cases that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
unconstitutional because of the lack of state action, the Supreme Court
refused to permit Conress to prohibit racial segregation by private
actors in public places. If the Supreme Court had instead supported the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in 1883, the Court would probably never have
approved the separate but equal doctrine thirteen years later. Brown's
endorsement of a race-neutral principle prohibiting the implementation
of the separate but equal doctrine by the states in public schools
officially invited the white political culture to adopt that race-neutral
principle as a means of conducting the affairs of a historically racist
society. 33
The Seattle and Louisville school desegregation cases, which
attempted to use race to promote racial diversity, raise the issue of
whether a court should abandon the Brown race-neutral principle of
prohibiting discrimination by the states in public schools in order to
allow school officials to promote racial diversity at the expense of a
rock solid principle of race neutrality. School officials would be wellserved to use the race-neutral principle of Brown to implement cultural
diversity in an increasingly multicultural America. Even if race does
matter to the majority of Americans, it should not matter to any person
making a decision about the use of governmental power.
In my opinion, the decision in Parents Involved once again invited
the Supreme Court to apply the race-neutral principle articulated by
30. Tushnet, supra note 18, at 177.
By this . . . [Tushnet] mean[s] that prior acts against segregation, such as the
desegregation of the armed forces and the several appearances by the
Department of Justice as amicus curiae supporting African-American
claims, were all discrete rather than general endorsements of a basic
principle (though, on the whole, motivated by that principle). Note, too, that
these prior acts were done by the executive branch; Congress did not act in
support of a principle of nondiscrimination until after Brown.
Id. n. 16.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 43 Cong. Ch. 114, Mar. 2, 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 335-36,
invalidated by the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32. Id.
33. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 177.
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Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,34 and, once
again, the Supreme Court refused to hold that the Equal Protection
Clause unequivocally prohibits the use of race by the government in
making decisions about the use of public resources.35 Justice Harlan
forcefully articulated the principle that equal protection, as applied
under the Constitution, should regard each individual as a person and
not consider either his or her race or color when applying the law. 36
Justice Harlan was disappointed that the Supreme Court concluded that
it was permissible under the Constitution for a state to deny AfricanAmerican citizens the equal protection of the law because of the color
of their skin. 37 Because the Supreme Court has failed to prohibit the
government from considering race when making decisions, the Supreme
Court has treated race as a suspect class that requires the government to
meet a less-than-rigid level of scrutiny in making decisions that
consider race as a factor. 38 The strict scrutiny standard should be
regarded as inherently flawed, because it is not strict in theory, and is
flexible in fact when the government articulates a plausible race-neutral
justification for its conduct.39
III. A REVIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND
STRICT SCRUTINY

The Equal Protection Clause states that no State shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 40 in
order for the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to truly
protect individuals, as well as groups, from discrimination by
governmental conduct using race as a factor, the use of race by public
officials should be strictly and absolutely prohibited. 4 1 The strict
scrutiny theory can only be effective as a prohibition on race
discrimination if it absolutely bars the use of race as a factor in any
decision or policy implemented by a governmental official.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has stated that the strict scrutiny
concept as plied to racial classifications is not "strict in theory but
fatal in fact." The strict scrutiny standard has evolved from being strict
34. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
35. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)
(applying strict scrutiny).
36. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
37. Id. at 560.
38. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
39. See id. (applying strict scrutiny).
40. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
42. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
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in theory but fatal in fact to serving as a flexible factor in the
consideration of the use of race by state actors.4 3 When it comes to
prohibiting intentional racial discrimination by public officials, strict
scrutiny has proven to be a paper tiger, because it does not always
prohibit the use of race as a factor in government decisions.
The Supreme Court concedes too much and compromises the Equal
Protection Clause by concluding that the clause does not invalidate all
governmental use of race. It stated that, "[a]lthough all governmental
uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it."44
A realistic utilization of the strict test should invalidate any and all use
of race as a factor for classifications and actions by the government.
Until the Supreme Court adopts a strict scrutiny "reality check" rule
that truly prohibits the use of race as a factor by the government in all
circumstances, strict scrutiny is merely legal conjecture, and not a
pragmatic rule of constitutional law designed to invalidate all race
preferential treatment by governmental actors. The current strict
scrutiny theory, as applied to race, encourages a variety of actors to
articulate creative group generalizations to establish enough compelling
interest to justify the intentional use of race-based classifications by
governmental officials. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that the Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the
use of race as a factor, and has held that, if the narrow-tailoring
requirement is met, race may be utilized as a factor to advance a
compelling governmental interest by public school officials without
violating the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.4 5
The Supreme Court has stated that "[n]ot every decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental 'decisionmaker'
for the use of race in that particular context."4 The narrow tailoring
requirement is not an appropriate measure for determining a compelling
interest justification for the use of the inherently toxic racial
classification, because the concept of narrow tailoring is too imprecise
to serve as a barrier to the use of race by public officials who intend to
impose either good or evil on individuals in our society. In my view, the
43. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27. "Although all governmental uses of race are subject
to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. . . . Context matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. "Not every decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
decision maker for the use of race in that particular context." Id. at 327.
44. Id at 326-27.
45. Id at 327.
46. Id.
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2007 opinion of the Court in Parents Involved' 7 represents a future
where the Supreme Court will implement the strict scrutiny test in a
manner which absolutely prohibits the use of race in making decisions
about student assignments to public schools.
The logic of the Supreme Court's holding in Parents Involved
supports the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States prohibits segregation of the races in
the public schools and requires that formal de jure equal opportunity be
given to children on a race-neutral basis.4 9 However, if the Supreme
Court takes the position in a future opinion that integration of children
in public schools is a per se compelling governmental interest, it would
be permissible for school officials to use race as a predominant factor in
making decisions about where to assign students. The strictly enforced
separate but equal doctrine was rejected, and school officials in the
Brown opinion were ordered to take the necessary and proper steps to
admit to students to public schools on a race-neutral basis. 0 The most
natural reading of Brown is its simple requirement that a state not
consider race as a factor in making decisions about which public
schools children will attend.
As observed by a District Court interpreting Brown, it is important to
consider what the Supreme Court decided the role of race was in its
Brown holding.51 In Brown, the Supreme Court did not hold that federal
courts have a duty to regulate public schools. 52 The Brown opinion did
not hold that states are required to mix people of different races to
advance multicultural diversity. 53
In rejecting white supremacy, the Supreme Court decided under
Brown that a state cannot deny to a person, because of her race, the right
to attend any public school that it sponsors. 54 Since the Brown decision,
if public schools
[are] open to children of all races, no violation of the Constitution
is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily
attend different schools, as they attend different churches.
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme
Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools
47. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsInvolved), 551
U.S. 701, 701 (2007).
48. Id.
49. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (discussing the Brown
opinion in detail).
50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
51. Briggs, 132 F. Supp. at 777.
52. Id.
5 3. Id.
54. Id.
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they attend.
Although I am a strong supporter of racial integration as good public
policy, nothing in the Constitution compels racial integration. Under the
Brown rationale, the Equal Protection Clause strictly outlaws policies
implementing racial discrimination in public schools.5 6 However, the
Constitution does not prohibit public school sefregation that is the
result of voluntary conduct of private individuals.5
The Constitution strictly prevents the use of governmental power to
implement racial segregation.5 8 The Fourteenth Amendment is properly
regarded as a limitation upon the exercise of power by the states, and
not as a restraint upon the freedom of individuals to select schools on a
race-neutral basis. The Supreme Court, in school desegregation cases,
requires public school officials to exercise good faith when applying the
constitutional principles that strictly prohibit using race as a
predominant factor in making decisions about student assignment.6 0
The Supreme Courts sent the pragmatic message in Parents
Involved 61 that the Equal Protection Clause requires that the use of race
by public school officials, when making decisions about who will be
assigned to a specific public school, should be rejected as
unconstitutional, unless the state can demonstrate that it is trying to
correct the continuing illegal effects of its past intentional racial
discrimination.62 Professor Eboni S. Nelson correctly contends that all
racial classifications in the context of education and admission of
students are subject to strict scrutiny, to protect against encroachment
on the individual rights granted through the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.63 Strict scrutiny is required to limit the potential
impact a person may suffer as64a result of the stigmatic harms inflicted
by group-based racial burdens.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One, 551 U.S. 701, 721
(2007).
62. Id. at 720. "One interest a school district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior
cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two
interests that qualify as compelling. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects
of past intentional discrimination." Id. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S 467 (1992).
63. Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved & Meredith: A Prediction Regarding the
(Un)Constitutionalityof Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 293,
324 (2006) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
64. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
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A court has a duty to apply the strict scrutiny test to reduce the
potential psychological harm that a schoolchild of any color or race may
suffer after being told that he or she will not be permitted to go to a
specific school because of his or her race.6 5 I contend that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits any and all use of race in the admissions
process of students to elementary and secondary education, because a
flexible strict scrutiny test does not adequately protect each individual
student from the foreseeable psychological injury proximately caused
by being denied admission to the public school of her choice because of
her race.66 In spite of the psychological harms imposed upon children
exposed to racial discrimination, some public policymakers seek to
implement race-conscious or race-preferential admission policies. 67
Issues involving racial identity, cultural traditions, and ethnic
relations are an important part of our national public debate about how
to create a more equal society.6 8 Unlike one commentator, I believe that
any race-conscious climate renews the call for constitutional
colorblindness in order to accommodate and respect the need for racial
equality as a human right. I reject the argument that it "would be
premature for the judicial branch simply to abolish all governmental
considerations of race." 69 I think that Parents Involved represents a
commitment to the reality in multicultural twenty-first century
American that effective race-neutral solutions must be utilized to correct
the continuing societal effects of past racial discrimination.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF PARENTS INVOLVED REVEALS A MANIFEST
FAILURE TO CONSIDER RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES TO ADVANCE
EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY UNDER A STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLAN
According to the Supreme Court, the Seattle and Jefferson County
65. Nelson, supra note 63, at 324.
66. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities
was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs.
Id.
67. Susan M. Maxwell, Racial Classifications Under Strict Scrutiny: Policy
Considerationsand the Remedial-Plus Approach, 77 TEx. L. REv. 259, 278 (1998).
68. Id. at 279.
69. Id.
70. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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school districts voluntarily embraced student assignment plans that
depended upon race in deciding which public schools individual
children could attend.' Seattle classified children as white or nonwhite;
in Jefferson County children were categorized as black or "other." 72 I
Seattle, racial classifications were utilized to distribute openings in
overpopulated high schools.7 3 In Jefferson County, race was considered
as a factor when deciding specific elementary school assignments and
transfer requests. 74 In both cases, the school district depended upon the
race in assigning students to specific schools; as a result, the racial
balance at each school fell "within a predetermined range based on the
racial composition of the school district as a whole."75 Parents of
students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans
solely because of their race properly claimed that assigning children to
separate public schools on the basis of a racial classification violates the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the law. 76 The
decisions of the Courts of Appeals upholding these plans were reversed
by the Supreme Court.
The Seattle School District's framing of the race and law issue
presented in the case strongly suggests that it believed that it could use
race as a significant factor in assigning students to a specific school to
promote racial diversity for the benefit of a society suffering from racial
isolation. Seattle did not have any history of implementing legallymandated racial segregation in the schools now wanting to consider race
when assigning students.7 8 The Jefferson County School District
contended that, in spite of its long history of state-sponsored school
segregation based on race, its relatively recent status as a unitary school
district allowed it to consider race as a factor to regulate racial
isolation. 79 The true race card issue presented in Parents Involved is
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a public school district
from considering race for the express purpose of regulating the racial
makeup of a public school's student body, when that makeup is the
result of private choice. The Supreme Court in Parents Involved
advanced the goal of colorblindness in public education by declaring
that all who play the race game must play by the same strict scrutiny,
race-neutral, equal protection rules.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at710-l1.
Id. at 711.
Id.
See id. at 709-11.
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Generally speaking, the dissent's disapproval of the holding in the
ParentsInvolved decision is directly linked to its energetic rejection of
any suggestion that the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause contains
a true colorblind requirement.8 0 Although Brown I did not spell out how
school districts were to bring an end to government-sponsored
intentional discrimination, the federal district courts responsible for
putting into practice the Brown 181 holding and its cohort case, Briggs v.
Elliott, interpreted Brown I as requiring officials to take race-neutral
steps to end state-sponsored racial discrimination in public school
82
districts. The Briggs colorblind theory to end racial segregation was
the accepted constitutional approach in allowing African-Americans to
attend previously all-white Jim Crow public schools until 1968, when
the Supreme Court, in the Green decision8 3 declined to follow its
original, race-neutral interpretation of Brown I.84
Thirty-nine years after the Green decision the rationale of the Court
in Parents Involved demonstrates that Green's failure to follow the
race-neutral, or colorblind, approach in assigning students to schools
was a temporary measure designed to bring to an end the compelling
disgrace of state-mandated racial segregation in public schools. 8 The
rationale for permitting temporary race-conscious student assignment in
Green was to advance the Court's compelling interest in promoting the
end of racial isolation created by segregation in public schools.8 The
temporary race-conscious student assignments in Green were not
intended to create an affirmative duty to pursue racial integration in
public education as a compelling societal interest.
Regrettably, the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not
promise us either a racially-integrated public education or the right to
live in a multicultural society free of irrational fears.8 8 The Equal
Protection Clause guarantees a person the right to a public education
free of intentional, state-sponsored, racial discrimination. I am sorry to
80. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Jonathan Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future ofRace-Based Policies
to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 491, 500 (2008) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 139 F. Supp. 468, 46970 (D. Kan. 1955)).
82. Id. (citing Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 E.D.S.C. (1955).
83. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
84. Id. at 501 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 442-43).
85. See id. at 496-97.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 440.
88. ContraParents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 80304 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (determining that
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the
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say that the Equal Protection Clause fails to guarantee all students,
regardless of their race or social economic status in our society, a
middle-class education.
A race-neutral or colorblind approach to assigning students to a
school should not allow a public school district to escape its moral and
societal duty to provide each and every child within a single school
district with a middle-class education. Sadly, the Supreme Court has
held that local property taxes generated within a school district were a
legitimate basis for denying students a middle-class education. 90
Although I support a race-neutral approach to student admission in
public schools, I do not support the unfairness of allowing the tax value
of local property to decide whether a child in America receives a
middle-class education.91
A state does not have a legitimate interest or rational basis to adopt a
policy for financing schools in a single district that provides a discrete
social and economic class of students with a lifetime of educational and
social advantages, while another social and economic class of students
is exposed to a lifetime of employment hardship because of the inferior
education they received under the state's discriminatory education
policy. 92 In Plyer v. Doe, the Court, under the rational basis standard of
review, refused to give constitutional deference to a state law that would
create a lifetime of hardship for a discrete class of undocumented
immigrant children by denying them the right to educational
opportunity because of the illegal conduct of their parents.9 3 The
Supreme Court should decline to give constitutional approval to any
public school funding plan that does not spend its money equally on
each and every student in each and every school district in the state.
This would prevent states from subjecting a discrete and foreseeable
class of students to a lifetime of hardship created by a systematic
environment of inferior education.
One goal of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (No Child Left
Behind or the "Act") is to address the racial disparity in academic
success in American education. 94 Since the Coleman Report in 1966,
commentators have attempted to adequately analyze the academic
achievement gap among students with different racial identities. 9 5
Although No Child Left Behind appears to admit that the achievement
minority
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

group equal educational opportunities).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
Id.
See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24, 230 (1982).
Id. at 220, 223-24, 230.
Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, No Child Left Behind Act, Race, and

Parents Involved, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 271, 271 (2008).

95. Id.

380

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

gap exists among students of different races, it does not require raceconscious techniques for carrying out the Act's requirement to close the
achievement disparity. 96 Professors Joseph 0. Oluwole and Preston C.
Green suggest that race-conscious implementation of No Child Left
Behind has a favorable future in the Supreme Court, under an Equal
Protection challenge.9 7 However, a race-conscious No Child Left
Behind might not be narrowly tailored, because socioeconomic factors
might be a much more reliable indicator of the achievement gap among
students of different races than the traditional race-based
classifications. 98
Although socioeconomic factors do not completely account for the
racial achievement gaps in the education process, I believe that the
socioeconomic status of the individual student is the predominant factor
for the continuing presence of a disparity in educational achievement
among students with different racial heritages. In my opinion,
policymakers should be able to establish with empirical data that
education equality from a group perspective is an intergenerational
process, and that socioeconomic factors are primarily responsible for
the educational achievement gap among whites and minority racial
groups. In order for policymakers to conclude that socioeconomic
factors are not the predominant factor in the educational achievement
gap between blacks and whites, the research must analyze at least three
generations of blacks and whites of similar socioeconomic statuses and
de facto educational opportunity in order to achieve credibility with me.
96. Id at 271-72.
97. Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, No Child Left Behind Act, Race, and
Parents Involved, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 271, 304-05 (2008). "Since race-conscious
implementation of NCLB would satisfy each of the three articulated elements, it seems evident
that the dissenters in Parents Involved would uphold race-conscious implementation of NCLB
designed to close the achievement gap." Id.
Considering the current Justices sitting on the Supreme Court, our analysis
of ParentsInvolved reveals that the dissenting Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens) would likely be receptive to race-conscious
implementation of NCLB's sanctions and remedies and race-conscious
funding under the Act. In contrast, Justice Thomas would clearly be
opposed to such race-conscious measures given his stringent standard for
strict scrutiny of racial classifications and his color-blind approach. Justice
Kennedy would likely be the swing vote in the decision. Based on his
concurrence in Parents Involved, Kennedy would likely support raceconscious implementation of NCLB as long as it is designed to close the
achievement gap.
Id. at 304-05 (Although Souter and Stevens are no longer members of the Supreme Court it
appears under the rationale of Oluwole & Green that Kennedy remains the swing vote because
Sotomayor and Kagan are likely to vote the same way on this issue as Souter and Stevens).
98. Id. at 300.
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From an African-American perspective, it is a socioeconomic fact of
life that intergenerational education matters when one looks for an
educational advantage. A number of smart school districts do not use
race as a factor but look at the socioeconomic status (SES) of students
as a viable means for achieving a diverse school population.9 9 SES is
thought of as a promising solution by many supporters of educational
diversity who agree with the assertion by James Coleman that student
achievement is impacted predominantly by family and social class.' 00
The Seattle School District utilized the race factor in assigning
students to schools because of its implicit belief that student
achievement is predominantly impacted by the racial makeup of the
student body rather than by family and social class. Seattle has never
required de jure separate but equal schools for students based on racial
identity, and it has never been required to desegregate its schools as the
result of a court order.' 0 Seattle made use of the racial tiebreaker to
deal with the impact of particular housing configurations on school
assignments.10 However, Seattle could have implemented a housing
configuration tiebreaker for school assignments to control the impact of
particular low income housing configurations and worked toward
closing the educational achievement gap among students on a raceneutral basis.
On the whole, white students lived in the northern portion of Seattle,
while most of the students identified as racial minorities lived in the
southern section of Seattle. 0 3 If, for the most part, more affluent
housing configurations existed in the northern portion of Seattle while
the majority of students within the less affluent housing was
concentrated in the southern section of Seattle, the school district could
have assigned students to specific schools based on the fair market
value of the housing concentration. This would have promoted
economic and cultural diversity while avoiding the strict scrutiny
standard required when race is considered in order to promote diversity.
School districts with educational diversity challenges similar to Seattle
may advance their educational diversity goal by considering housing
configuration when making race-neutral student assignments. School
districts using housing configuration as a proxy for household income in
making student assignment are very likely to avoid the costly litigation
incurred by Seattle in defending a school diversity plan that considered
99. Craig R. Heeren, "Together at the Table of Brotherhood" Voluntary Student
Assignment Plans and the Supreme Court,24 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 133, 175-76 (2008).
100. Id
101. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One, 551 U.S. 701, 712
(2007).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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race as a factor.
In the ParentsInvolved opinion, the original plaintiff is described as
"a nonprofit corporation consisting of the parents of children who have
been or may be denied assignment to their chosen high school in the
district because of their race." 04 A plaintiff challenging a school
district's use of housing configuration as a factor in assigning a student
to a specific school would essentially allege that she is a parent of a
child who has been, or may be, deprived of assignment to a selected
high school in the district, because housing configuration as a proxy for
household income was used by the school in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. However, such a challenge is not likely to be
successful, because courts using traditional standards should give a
great deal of deference to public officials using housing configurations
to make decisions about promoting socioeconomic diversity in
education.
In Parents Involved, Jill Kurfirst unsuccessfully attempted to enroll
her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High School's distinctive
Biotechnology Career Academy. 05 Andy had attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia, but he improved with hands-on
teaching, and his mother and teachers believed that the smaller
biotechnology curriculum offered at Ballard High provided the greatest
potential for his continued progress.106 Andy was admitted into this
particular program, but because of the racial tiebreaker, he was
subsequently not assigned to Ballard High School. 0 7 The nonprofit
corporation, Parents Involved in Community Schools, believed that
children similar to Andy in the Seattle School District were being
deprived of the school assignment of their choice because race was used
as the predominant factor in assignments, so it filed a lawsuit alleging
that Seattle's use of race in assignments was prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 0 8 Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,109 and the Washington Civil Rights Act. 0
The prior legal history of the ParentsInvolved decision demonstrates
that reasonable judges are very likely to disagree on whether a public
104. Id. at 713.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race ... be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2010).
110. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 714. "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."
WASH. REv. CODE

§ 49.60.400(1)

(2006)).
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school system has demonstrated a compelling interest to support the
voluntary use of race as a factor in making an individual student
assignment decision in order to promote racial integration. In Parents
Involved, the federal district court approved the summary judgment
request of the Seattle School District, by ruling that state law did not
prevent Seattle's use of the racial tiebreaker because the plan passed
strict scrutiny, because it was narrowly tailored to carry out an
implicitly compelling governmental interest in promoting either racial
diversity or racial integration for the benefit of society.' At first, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision by
ruling that, under the Washington Civil Rights Act,"l 2 the school
district's utilization of the integration tiebreaker was unconstitutional.113
However, after recognizing that the lawsuit would not be decided
soon enough to affect student assignment decisions for the 2002-2003
school term, the Ninth Circuit did away with its opinion,"l 4 vacated the
injunction, and, under section 2.60.020 of the Revised Code of
Washington, certified the state-law issue involving the racial tiebreaker
to the Washington Supreme Court.' '5 The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that the Washington Civil Rights Act forbids specifically
those preferential access plans "that use race or gender to select a less
qualified applicant over a more qualified applicant," and not those
"[p]rograms which are racially neutral, such as the . . . [district's] open

choice plan."ll 6
The Washington Supreme Court sent the case back to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for additional action." 7 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit subsequently reversed the district court's decision for a second
time and addressed the Equal Protection Clause question.118 The panel
decided that although accomplishing racial diversity and circumventing
racial separation are compelling government interests,1l9 Seattle's
111. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (ParentsInvolved 1), 137
F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
112. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsInvolved 11), 285
F.3d 1236, 1253 (9th Cir. 2002)), op. withdrawn on grant of reh'g, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.
2002).
113. Id.
114. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsInvolved Ill),
294 F.3d 1084, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002)).
115. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsInvolved IV),
294 F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)).
116. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, (Parents Involved V)
149 Wash. 2d 660, 663, 689-90 (2003) (en banc)).
117. Id. at 690.
118. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (ParentsInvolved VI),
377 F.3d 949, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2004)).
119. Id.at 964.
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application of the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored enough to
support those interests under the Equal Protection Clause.' 20 The Ninth
Circuit granted a rehearing en banc,121 and rejected the panel's
judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that
Seattle's plan was narrowly tailored to carry out a compelling
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause.122
The Seattle School District probably could have avoided problematic
and protracted litigation over its diversity plan by implementing a
student assignment plan devoid of racial classifications, and instead
based on housing configurations and academic performance. Wake
County, North Carolina, uses academic achievement and family income
in its student assignment program to promote academic success for

students.123
Jefferson County manages the public school structure in the urban
Louisville, Kentucky community. In 1973, a federal court concluded
that Jefferson County had preserved a segregated school organization,124
and in 1975, the district court structured a desegregation order.125
Jefferson County functioned under this command until 2000, when the
district court ended the order after finding that the school district had
reached unitary status by removing the effects of its past policy of racial
segregation. 12 In 2001, subsequent to the order of the federal district
court being dissolved, Jefferson County approved a voluntary racebased student assignment arrangement.
Roughly 34% of Jefferson's
97,000 students are black; nearly all of the other 66% are white.' 2 8 The
plan calls for all non-magnet schools to sustain a minimum black
enrollment of 15%, and a maximum black enrollment of 50%.129 Under
the Jefferson County plan, decisions about student assignments were
based on a combination of available openings within a school and the
120. Id. at 980.
121. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 395 F.3d 1168, 1168
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
122. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 707, 714 (2007).
Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (ParentsInvolved VII), 426 F.3d
1162, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted,547 U.S. 1177 (2006), rev'd and remanded, 551
U.S. 701 (2007).
123. Elizabeth Jean Bower, Note, Answering the Call: Wake County's Commitment to
Diversity in Education, 78 N.C. L. REv. 2026, 2029 (2000).
124. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 715 (citing Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ.,
489 F.2d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated with
modifications, 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (6th Cir. 1974)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 716.
128. McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839-40 n.6 (W.D. Ky.
2004).
129. Id at 842.
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racial balancing required under the guidelines of the student assignment
plan.130 Jefferson County should have adopted a student assignment
plan that was based on a combination of available openings within a
school and a housing configuration balancing requirement without any
consideration of race.
Crystal Meredith relocated to the Jefferson County School District in
August 2002 and tried to register her child, Joshua McDonald, in
kindergarten for the 2002-2003 school year.131 One school was only a
mile from Meredith's new home, but the school did not have any
existing space because assignments were made in May, and the
kindergarten class was already full.1 32 Jefferson County assigned Joshua
to Young Elementary.' 3 3 Because Young Elementary was ten miles
from their home, Meredith wanted to transfer Joshua to Bloom
Elementary, another school that was only a mile from their new
home.1 34 Openings existed for students at Bloom, but Joshua's transfer
request was rejected because granting him a transfer would have had a
negative impact on the racial balancing requirements for Young
Elementary. 1 If Jefferson County had a housing configuration
balancing requirement, even if an opening existed for students at
Bloom, Joshua's request to transfer to Bloom could be rejected without
invoking strict scrutiny if granting him a transfer would have a negative
impact on the housing configuration for Young Elementary. Under my
hypothetical policy, Jefferson County would also argue that its housing
configuration policy is a proxy for household income and not a proxy
for race.
In the actual case, Meredith objected to Jefferson County's use of
race in making student assignments.136 Meredith filed suit in federal
district court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 37 The district court held that Jefferson County
had established a compelling interest in keeping its schools racially
diverse and that the use of race in the assignment plan was narrowly
tailored to achieve that compelling interest. 3 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed with the federal district court, adopting the rationale
of the lower federal court, and expressly indicating that providing an
130. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 716.
131. Id. at 717.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D.
Ky. 2004)).
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additional written opinion would not be useful. 139 In ParentsInvolved,
the federal appellate courts in both the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit
failed to acknowledge that racial discrimination in assigning students to
a specific school is constitutionally objectionable under equal protection
principles, whether it is packaged under the guise of prejudice or racial
preference. 140 The Supreme Court will only approve a race-preference
plan involving student assignments which is attacked under equal
protection principles in the unlikely event that the plan survives strict
scrutiny. 141
The student assignment plans in Seattle and Jefferson County were
not narrowly tailored under the strict scrutiny test, because they
unnecessarily relied on explicit racial considerations, rather than
housing considerations and student achievement, in making student
assignments to achieve their diversity goal. 142 "The court decisions that
invalidated race-conscious student assignment plans mandate a
colorblind approach to student assignments in sharp contrast with the
long-standing deference granted to local authorities in the formulation
of education policy." 43 The legal impetus for Wake County's raceneutral diversity plan was its correct understanding that the judicial
momentum strongly suggests that courts utilizing strict scrutiny, when
analyzing race-conscious student assignment plans under the Equal
Protection Clause, will find them invalid. 144
School administrators no longer operating under desegregation
decrees must now put into practice student assignment procedures
without considering race. 145 Race-neutral student assignment plans
challenge school boards to prove their true commitment to real diversity
in education by closing the academic achievement gap. 146 Wake County
responded to this educational achievement challenge by cultivating a
student assignment plan intended to guarantee a more diverse

139. Id. at 718 (citing McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir.
2005)).
140. L. Damell Weeden, Affirmative Action CaliforniaStyle-Proposition 209: The Right
Message While Avoiding a Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 281, 284 (1997) (evaluating racial prejudice and racial preference by
asserting that old-fashioned discrimination is supported by racial prejudice while new age
discrimination has racial preference as its foundation).
141. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court
Should Have Adopted a New Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-Preference
Student Assignment Plans, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 277, 278 (2008).
142. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 726; Bower, supra note 123, at 2029.
143. Bower, supra note 123, at 2029.
144. Id. at 2029-30.
145. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S at 721; see also Bower, supra note 123, at 2030.
146. Bower, supra note 123, at 2026.

2010]

INCOME INTEGRATION ASA RACE-NEUTRAL PURSUIT OF EQUALITYAND DIVERSITY

387

educational experience without adopting race-based classifications. 147
The Supreme Court has not outlawed all types of intentional statesponsored racial segregation of individuals. Under the flawed strict
scrutiny standard, a public school may be able to practice intentional
racial segregation of students in order to control potential racial tension
on campus. The Supreme Court has indicated that the California
Department of Corrections' (CDC) unwritten policy of intentionally
racially segregating prisoners for up to sixty days every time they enter
a new correctional facility should be subjected to the strict scrutiny
standard of review for an equal protection analysis.14 8
The CDC's stated reason for practicing intentional racial segregation
is to avoid violence caused by racial gangs.149 An associate warden
testified that if race was not a factor in managing preliminary housing
assignments, racial clashes in the cells and in the yard would
increase. 1o In my opinion, compelling state interest, whether narrowly
tailored or not, is too fluid a constitutional theory to ever justify the use
of race as an acknowledged intentional factor in making a governmental
decision.
Justice Thomas's hands-off approach and willingness to support
race-based segregation as articulated by the CDC in the prison case,1st
is very difficult to reconcile with his full endorsement of a colorblind
government requirement for public school officials making decisions
about where to assign students in an effort to promote the racial
integration of schools.1 52 I think Justice Thomas's failure to require a
colorblind approach in all governmental decision-making, including
assignment of prisoners to jail cells, leaves him open to the criticism
that he is not a true follower of the colorblind philosophy articulated by
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy.153
Unlike Justice Thomas, I think the government should never be
allowed to classify persons based on race regardless of whether it is
making decisions about housing prisoners, assigning children to public
schools, or making judgments about who should be admitted to either
medical or law school. I will be the first to concede that neither our
society nor our government is colorblind, but I believe that a forwardthinking Supreme Court should construe the U.S. Constitution's Equal
147. Id.
148. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005).
149. Id. at 502.
150. Id. at 502-03.
151. Id. at 506 n.1; id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 801, 779 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
153. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-55 (1896) (Harlan, J., concurring); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 779 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Protection Clause to require the government to implement
colorblindness in all of its policies. Our society should immediately
endorse colorblindness as a necessary and proper first step to achieve
equality and mutual respect for every person regardless of race.
V. THE PROMISE OF BROWN MAY BE RESURRECTED BY DISMANTLING
INCOME SEGREGATION AMONG STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Some forward-thinking school districts do not use race as a factor in
making student assignments, looking instead at the socioeconomic
status (SES) of school children as a reasonable means to achieve
diversity in school.1 54 I lend my support to those who see SES as an
effective race-neutral tool for advancing educational diversity. In 2006,
the year before the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved,
Richard Kahlenberg asserted that integration of public schools based on
family income was a more effective way to achieve equal education
than the consideration of race in making student assignments.'" If the
socioeconomic status of the student body is a more important factor in
determining student achievement than the racial make-up of the student
body,156 a race-conscious student assignment plan promoting equal
education violates the Equal Protection Clause's narrowly tailoring
requirement.' 57 When it is societal poverty and not state action based on
consideration of race that creates an inherently unequal education for a
disproportionate number of African-American students, the Equal
Protection Clause is not violated. 5 8
The Supreme Court has held that racial preference in secondary
education cannot be rooted in a desire to remedy societal discrimination
59
by providing minority students with positive minority role models.1
Under Brown v. Board of Education,' promoting equal education with
race-conscious student assignment, without first eliminating the
concentrations of poverty that inherently produce unequal education
programs, is a violation of the narrowly tailored requirements of the
154. Heeren, supra note 99, at 175.
155. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Integration by Income, AM. SCH. BoARD J., Apr. 1,
2006, available at http://www.equaleducation.org/commentary.asp?opedid=1332 [hereinafter
Kahlenberg, Integrationby Income].
156. Id.
157. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003). In Gratz, the Court held that because the
University of Michigan's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the school's declared compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy
offended the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
158. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
159. Id.
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Equal Protection Clause. Race-conscious remedies should be
implemented only when effective race-neutral alternatives are not
available.' 6 ' There is plenty of evidence that reducing the percentage of
economically disadvantaged students in the student body inherently
promotes equal education for students without using race as a factor.162
Some school districts are adopting a socioeconomic integration
strategy because traditional methods of promoting educational equality
through the simple act of racial integration have proven to be
inadequate.163 Reliable research demonstrates that the academic
advantages of racial desegregation stem not from granting AfricanAmerican students an opportunity to sit next to whites, but from giving
them the opportunity to attend primarily middle-class institutions.164 In
middle-class schools, students typically are together with peers who are
expected to value academic success and are not as likely to disrupt class
as students attending high-poverty schools.1 6 5
Middle-class peers usually possess superior vocabularies, which are
casually conveyed to student colleagues in the course of
conversation.166 In middle-class schools, friends are not as likely to
move away in the middle of the school year and disrupt the dynamic of
the class. Middle-class students "have big dreams and are more likely to
plan to go on to college."l67 In middle-class schools, "parents are four
times as likely to be members of the PTA as low-income parents." 68
As a general rule, middle-class schools appeal to the best teachers. 6 9
Teachers in middle-class schools possess higher teacher test scores, are
expected to teach in their field of expertise, and tend to demonstrate
higher expectations for students.170 "One federal study found that the
grade of 'A' in a low-income school is the same as the grade of 'C' in a
middle-class school when students are compared on standardized
tests."' 7 ' The research suggests that middle-class children will not be
hurt by attending economically mixed schools.' 72 When a majority of
the students remain middle-class (described as students who do not
qualify for free and reduced-price lunch), their success rate does not

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
Kahlenberg, Integrationby Income, supra note 155, at 51.
Id
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
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deteriorate.17 3 "This is true in part because the majority sets the tone in a
school, and because research finds that middle-class children are less
affected by school influences (for good or ill) than low-income
children." 1' 4
Although racial isolation is not good public policy for an
increasingly diverse American society, the research suggests that
economic isolation has a greater negative impact on a child's education
than racial isolation.' 7 5 While discussing the negative impact of racial
isolation in public schools on minorities, Professor Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson contends that under federal regulations, racial isolation occurs
at a school when more than fifty percent of its enrolled students are
However, it is my position that
considered to be minorities.
Robinson's analysis, regarding the adverse impact of racial isolation on
the quality of education a student receives, applies with equal or greater
force to the inherently inferior education any students receives because
of income isolation in schools.' 7 7
One could make the argument that income isolation occurs in school
when the population of low-income students enrolled at a school
exceeds fifty percent. I think it is appropriate to characterize a student as
being of a low-income household if she is eligible for free or reducedprice lunch at school.' 7 8 I recommend that school districts attack
inherently unequal education under the income isolation theory, because
when it is properly implemented, it is race-neutral and advances the
goal of giving every student a competitive middle-class education.
Race-neutral efforts to attack income isolation in public schools
promote equal education for all students attending public school without
having to meet the narrowly tailored standards of the Equal Protection
Clause required under Parents Involved.179 The two school districts in
ParentsInvolved failed to demonstrate that they considered alternative
approaches to explicit racial classifications to realize their diversity
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understandingand
Remedying how the Supreme Court ReconstitutionalizedSegregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV.
787, 789 (2010) [hereinafter Robinson, Resurrecting].
177. See id. at 815-16. "The Court's failure to address housing discrimination led many
lower courts to ignore this important contribution to school segregation and thus, severely
undermined the development of effective school desegregation remedies." Id.
178. See Kahlenberg, Integration by Income, supra note 155 ("An Economic Policy
Institute study, for example, found that middle-class schools (those with fewer than [fifty]
percent of students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch) are 24 times as likely to be
consistently high performing as low-income schools (those with [fifty] percent or more of
students eligible for subsidized lunch).").
179. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007).
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goals. 80 The narrow tailoring mandate requires serious, good faith
efforts to find effective race-neutral alternatives.' 8 ' In Seattle, a number
of alternative assignment plans-which would not have used express
racial classifications-were abandoned with little or no concern. 182
Jefferson County simply failed to provide any evidence that it
considered any race-neutral options.183
Approximately five months after the Parents Involved decision,
Richard D. Kahlenberg discussed the entrenched Metropolitan Council
for Educational Opportunity (Metco) program to demonstrate the equal
protection challenges confronting state officials utilizing race-conscious
measures to promote diversity when an effective income integration
alternative is available.1 84 Since 1966, Metco has provided minority
students in Boston the chance to go to more affluent, predominantly
white suburban schools, in an attempt to introduce those students to an
improved education, as well as to provide economically-advantaged
schools with the benefits of a more socially diverse student body.1 8 1
When the Supreme Court struck down voluntary race-conscious school
diversity plans in Louisville and Seattle, Justice Anthony Kennedy
made it clear that he specifically objected to diversity plans that
assigned children by race without pursuing race-neutral alternatives.186
The Massachusetts Department of Education has maintained that
Metco is perfectly legal and does not need any changes to meet the
standards of the Supreme Court ruling.' 87 However, Kahlenberg
declares that "Metco's program does precisely what Kennedy's opinion
forbids. The Metco program sorts individual students by race. It has not
explored race-neutral alternatives. And it doesn't use race merely as a
factor; it provides an absolute bar to white students."' 8 8
By asserting that changes to Metco's program are not necessary after
Parents Involved, Massachusetts is endorsing a program that has the
practical effect of inviting challengers of race-conscious diversity plans
to sue.
Recent history suggests that right-wing enemies of school
integration will seek an exceptionally sympathetic plaintiff, probably a
low-income white girl attending a very bad Boston school, who wants
to attend a suburban school but cannot participate in Metco because she
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Richard D. Kablenberg, Op-Ed, How to save Metco, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2007,
at 15A, availableat 2007 WLNR 22427152 [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Op-Ed].
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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is white.190 "The plaintiffs will almost surely win in the end, sending a
disastrous signal to school districts nationally that they should back
away completely from race-conscious integration plans." I agree with
Kahlenberg's conclusion that the plaintiff in this hypothetical challenge
to the Metco program is likely to be successful. However, unlike
Kahlenberg, I do not consider that result to be a disaster because the
race-neutral alternatives available to Metco are likely to be very
effective in promoting educational euality without discriminating
against any student because of her race. I
Although Justice Kennedy, in Parents Involved, did not close the
door completely on race-conscious plans to achieve racial diversity, he
should have, because all race-conscious plans are divisive tools for
undermining the colorblind principle. "Justice Harlan advocated for
colorblindness as a positive expression of a principle of equal respect
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy argues
against 'crude' methods of selecting for racial diversity because they
express an attitude that violates that principle of equal respect." 93
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts signaled an end to raceconscious plans to achieve diversity by asserting that the way to end
94
racial discrimination is to stop the practice of racial discrimination.1
According to Justice Kennedy, the Metco plan does not qualify as a
permissible use of a race-conscious plan because the Massachusetts
Department of Education did not consider race-neutral alternatives
before adopting race as a controlling factor. 195 Metco could save its
societal diversity plan from a potentially successful constitutional attack
190.
191.
192.
193.
(2009).
194.
(2007).
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 5, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1175, 1215
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48
Id. at 789-90 (J. Kennedy, J., concurring).
Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by
race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in
the school districts. Yet, as explained each has failed to provide the support
necessary for that proposition ("the history of racial classifications in this
country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive
pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis").
And individual racial classification employed in this manner may be
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling
interest.

Id.
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by screening students for admission to suburban schools based on
income rather than race.1 96 "Boston public school students are [eighty
six] percent minority to begin with, and if Boston is like other districts,
the minority students are more likely than white students to qualify for a
means-tested program."' 9 7
According to Kahlenberg, in the unlikely event that economicallychallenged urban whites disproportionately apply to the Metco program,
Metco should be allowed to use race as a secondary factor in assigning
students, and it should be able to avoid a successful constitutional
challenge because income, not race, is the predominant factor. 198 Unlike
Kahlenberg, I believe that any use of race in assigning students to a
public school is neither secondary nor minor when voluntarily done to
promote racial integration. Instead, it is a thinly disguised pretext to
engage in the prohibited act of discrimination without meeting the
compelling state interest requirement. The method of integration based
primarily on income used in Cambridge public schools, which still
safeguards race as a permissible criterion by which to promote racial
integration, is problematic under relevant equal protection analysis.
Under the Cambridge plan, "income integration is not a substitute
for racial integration; it is a partner in achieving the goal," 99 according
to Kahlenberg. If public school officials in Cambridge are allowed to
use race in assigning students only after the income integration plan has
failed to meet an anticipated goal of racial integration, income
integration will become an unacceptable substitute for racial
discrimination. Income integration should not be misused and allowed
to become a partner in the race card game.
True income integration should be designed to promote the
educational equality goal of Brown, rather than to advance school
integration by a simple numerical balance. "One of the great lessons of
the Boston busing crisis of the 1970s was that racial integration, while
very important, was limited by the failure to recognize the importance
of economic class. Mixing poor whites and poor blacks did not raise
academic achievement in the city schools." 200
While I support Kahlenberg's conclusion that Metco and other
public school officials have the chance to remedy the academic
achievement gap problem among students by considering economic
status, 201 I respectfully reject his recommendation to school officials to
consider race when assigning students for purposes of closing the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Kahlenberg, Op-Ed, supranote 184, at 15A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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academic achievement gap if racial integration is not adequately
increased by income integration.202 A true income integration plan that
does not consider race under any circumstances could serve as a model
of how to close the achievement gap in education based on income is
good for all our children who deserve to be free of racial
discrimination.2 0 3
Robinson contends that school districts may seek to produce
diversity by embracing a flawed race-neutral approach that permits the
indirect consideration of race. 204 Under Robinson's theory of race
neutrality, a student assignment plan that avoids classifying individual
students based on their racial identity may nevertheless pursue racial
diversity through the indirect consideration of race. M Robinson
provides three allegedly race-neutral examples of indirect consideration
of race: (1) student assignment plans that integrate based on
socioeconomic status, (2) drawing school attendance zones to bring
diverse groups together, and (3) offering magnet programs."2 0 6 Because
the three examples presumably would allow indirect or allegedly nonindividual consideration of race as a significant factor along with
socioeconomic status in assigning students, the examples are not truly
race neutral from a colorblind perspective simply because they are
called "indirect." 207 A watered-down version of equal protection review
for student assignment plans allowing the indirect consideration of race
as a factor, "effectively assures that race will always be relevant in
American life," 208 and serves as an impairment to the critical purpose of
completely removing consideration of a person's race completely from
any decision made by a governmental entity.209
First, a true socioeconomic integration plan would not consider race
either directly or indirectly as a factor because the goal of income
integration is colorblind, equal education, not racial integration.
Secondly, a true race-neutral plan that draws school attendance zones to
establish income diversity would not consider race, either directly or
indirectly because its goal is to promote the societal interest in closing
the academic achievement gap among various groups, regardless of the
race of the individual. Third, a magnet program that is designed to
promote educational diversity is only race-neutral if it is offered to
202. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 280 (2009) [hereinafter Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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students without any consideration of race.
An approach is not race-neutral when it invokes an intentional
indirect consideration of race as a factor.2o When school officials make
decisions about school assignments based on an intentional, indirect
consideration of race as a factor, the strict scrutiny test applies because
any intentional use of race by the state should be considered as
suspect.211 Because equal protection analysis is determined by
intentional conduct, intentional indirect consideration of race as a factor
to reduce racial isolation by denying whites an equal opportunity to
attend a school inherently violates the theory of race neutrality. 212
Virtually everything in Robinson's race-neutral examples invokes a
little touch of race, as needed. 2 13 A flexible race-neutral concept could
be used, purportedly to advance the goal of expanding racial diversity,
to intentionally discriminate against some students because of their race
in violation of true governmental race neutrality.214 Robinson correctly
observes that school "[d]istricts that want to use a racial classification to
achieve diversity and to avoid racial isolation will encounter
tremendous difficulty satisfying the Court's narrow tailoring
requirements, particularly after ParentsInvolved."2 15
Those who oppose racial isolation, because it places some of the
same negative burdens on the opportunity for a student to receive an
equal education as low-income isolation, should join the fight to support
income integration in public education. The Supreme Court is very
likely to find that any plan that considers race as a factor in order to
promote racial diversity does not meet the narrowly tailored
requirement.216 A true race-neutral plan which is not a proxy for race
and which assigns students to a school based on income is founded on
socioeconomic status diversity; therefore, the plan is subject to a court's
minimal rational basis review and does not have to meet the narrowly
tailored standard, because it promotes societal diversity without any
217
consideration of race.
While I share the commitment to create more diversity in public
schools, I do not support the position that it is acceptable, under a
proper race-neutral application of the Equal Protection Clause, to use
210. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991).
211. See JA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
212. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362.
213. Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture, supra note 204, at 280.
214. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362.
215. Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture, supra note 204, at 287.
216. See id.
217. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). When applying minimal
rationality, the Supreme Court allows public officials to take one step at a time when addressing
social or economic issues. Id. at 489.

396

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

race to create diversity. 2 18 Robinson correctly believes that the end of
racial desegregation litigation does not require diminished attention to
the potentially negative impact of racial isolation in schools. 2 19 The
ending of racial desegregation litigation provides a golden opportunity
for supporters of equal education to energetically campaign for support
for closing the education achievement gap among students by
encouragin school officials to diversify schools based on income rather
than race.
School officials who choose to measure diversity by income rather
than race are in a better position to concentrate "on improving the
educational opportunities offered in all schools or in schools that
primarily educate minority schoolchildren."221 Public school officials
should be persistent in establishing income diversity when
implementing student assignment policies, because one commentator
contends that racial diversity for the simple sake of racial diversity is
not a legitimate government purpose to pursue. 222 "Presumably, the best
objective an educational institution could pursue, by definition, is
improving the education that all students receive, regardless of race." 223
Research shows that income diversity, or income integration,
improves educational outcomes for economically disadvantaged
students in a number of well-defined ways.224 Relying on this research,
public school officials should immediately place income integration on
their agenda as a means of nurturing successful outcomes of educational
diversity and closing the academic achievement gap among students. 225
Those who support using race as a factor to improve educational
outcomes for all students will not feel like they have abandoned the
fight for racial equality in education by supporting true race-neutral
alternatives if they accept Professor Thomas Kleven's contention that
race and class are highly interrelated.2 2 6 Kleven asserts "that the United
States is systemically a highly classist and racist society, that classism
and racism are interrelated and overlapping phenomena, and that the
achievement of a non-classist/non-racist society requires a mass
movement of working-class people of all ethnicities for social and racial
218. Robinson, Resurrecting,supra note 176, at 843.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest:
Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REv. 923, 924 (2002)) (citing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
223. Id.
224. Kahlenberg, Integrationby Income, supranote 155.
225. Id.
226. Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in the United States?, 8 CoNN. PuB. INT. L.J. 207, 207 (2009).
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justice for all."2 2 7 I will articulate the argument that adopting a raceneutral income integration policy in assigning students to a public
school in a highly classist and racist society is likely to improve the
educational outcomes of working-class people of all ethnicities and
races because, like race, money matters. After Barack Obama was
elected the 44th President228 of the United States of America on
November 4, 2008, racism in America did not end; however, his
election raised the very controversial question of whether class now
matters more than race. Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether
race matters more than class, but only the misguided will argue that race
and class are not interrelated.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the
"heritage" of Brown requires public school officials to obey the code of
colorblindness, articulated by Justice Harlan stating that the law is not
free to classify our citizens based on their race.229 Chief Justice Roberts
recognized that Brown represents equality because it prohibits states
from treating any person or groups differently because of their race. 230
I agree that Brown represents egalitarian ideals. I believe that the
egalitarian goals of Brown can best be achieved by requiring the school
officials to aggressively integrate African-Americans into American
society by adopting colorblind income integration with the specific goal
of closing the education achievement gap in the nation's public schools.
Brown symbolizes the American dream of colorblind equality by public
school officials when assigning students to schools and "embodies the
same ideals that were proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence." 23 1 A state does not have a constitutional obligation to
provide a public education, but if the state elects to provide students
with a public education, it should avoid any consideration of race. This
will allow the state to achieve educational equality by demonstrating
that colorblind income integration is a rational means of achieving the
goal of leaving no child behind. I believe that a true race-neutral
application of income integration which assigns an important, yet
227. Id.
228. Before a Huge Grant Park Crowd, President-elect Obama Declares: "Change has
come to America," CIU. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com
/media/acrobat/2008-11/43200911 .pdf.
229. Sharon L. Browne & Elizabeth A. Yi, The Spirit of Brown in Parents Involved and
Beyond, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 657, 659 (2009).
230. Id. at 659-60.
231. Id. at 660.
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limited, number of students from low-income households to middleclass schools without any consideration of race, may serve as a proper
tool to attack the educational achievement gap that exists between
middle-class schools and low-income schools.
Those among us who believe in equality in the educational process
must work to remove race-neutral income discrimination as an
unreasonable stumbling block to a middle-class education for too many
of our children who live in low-income homes. Income integration
represents a colorblind method to expand the opportunity for all
children to receive a middle-class education. Mixing a critical mass of
low-income students with a majority of middle-class students in a
middle-class school, without any consideration of race is a colorblind
strategy that appeals to those of us who believe that every child, even
one who is a member of a low-income family, deserves a middle-class
public education whenever possible. This author concedes that income
integration may not be feasible in a school district where there are no
middle-class schools and, in similar fashion, racial integration in
middle-class suburban schools may not be feasible where a critical mass
of racial minority students is not available. However, where middleclass schools are available, we should use this colorblind approach to
provide all children with the education they deserve.

